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I. Introduction
The intellectual property protection regime under the
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights ("TRIPS Agreement") of the World Trade Organization
("WTO") raises certain public health concerns regarding access to
medicine. 1 However, the TRIPS Agreement includes various
flexibilities that may be utilized by its member nations to
ameliorate its negative impact on access to medicine.2 One such
flexibility is the Paragraph 6 System, which is a mechanism that
permits a nation with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities
to utilize compulsory licensing effectively by importing generic
drugs from another country.
This paper will highlight some of the difficulties involved
in using the Paragraph 6 System as determined by its first and only
use in the trade of Apo-TriAvir from Canada to Rwanda. This
paper will propose potential revisions that may be made to the
Paragraph 6 System or other future legislation implementing the
Paragraph 6 System at a national level in order to render future
usage of the System more effective. Finally, this paper will
attempt to provide a realistic view of the impact of intellectual
property protection on access to medicine.
I See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC,
108 Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
2 See id. at art. 27. Article 27 of the TRIPS agreement gives participating
countries discretion in the protection of patented processes or products when there is a
concern for the "ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal, or plant
life or health...." Id. Furthermore, under Article 27 the TRIPS agreement allows
members to "exclude from patentability: (a) diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods
for the treatment of humans or animals. . . ." Id.
3 See Decision of the General Council, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 (Aug. 30,
2003) [hereinafter Decision of 30 Aug. 2003].
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II. What is the Paragraph 6 System?
To fully understand the Paragraph 6 System, it is important
first to understand the limitations that the TRIPS Agreement
places on exercising compulsory licensing.
The Paragraph 6 System is a special type of compulsory
licensing scheme.' A compulsory license refers to a governmental
authorization to exploit a patented invention without the consent
of the patent holder.'
According to the Doha Declaration,6 adopted by the TRIPS
Council in 2001, each member nation has the "freedom to
determine the grounds upon which [compulsory] licenses are
granted."' However, Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement lays out
certain procedural restrictions on using compulsory licensing,
including: (1) "authorization on individual merits"; (2) "prior
negotiations"; (3) "adequate remuneration"; and (4) "judicial
review of the decisions," which are explained in further detail
below.'
The requirement for "authorization on individual merits"
refers to the obligation of the member nations to consider whether
to grant compulsory licensing on a medicine-by-medicine basis.
A blanket compulsory licensing for all pharmaceutical products is
not permissible. The "prior negotiations" requirement obligates
the member nations not to grant a compulsory license unless the
patent owner has been given an opportunity to license the drug
voluntarily based on "reasonable commercial terms and
conditions."'o For example, in the event that a government would
like to issue a compulsory license in order to produce a patented
medicine domestically, the government is first required to contact
4 Id. at pmbl.
5 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 31. Article 31 outlines the guidelines
that regulate a member country whose laws permit the use of a product or process
without the authorization of the patent holder. Id.
6 See Ministerial Declaration, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (Nov. 20, 2001) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
7 Id. 5.
8 HOLGER HESTERMEYER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WTO: THE CASE OF PATENTS
AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 245-49 (2007).
9 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 31(a).
10 Id. art. 31(b).
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the patent holder for a voluntary license. Additionally, the
"adequate remuneration" requirement and the "judicial review of
the decisions" requirement ensure that the patent holder is paid for
the use of the patented product under the compulsory license, and
that the patent holder is provided with a judicial forum within
which the legitimacy of the compulsory license can be
challenged."
It is important to note that, in the event of "national
emergencies or other circumstances of extreme urgency," the
requirement of prior negotiation with the patent holder is waived.12
In such a case, the patent holder can be notified after the use, "as
soon as reasonably practicable." 3 In the event of "public non-
commercial use," the patent holder should be informed promptly if
the government or government contractor "knows or has
demonstrable grounds" to know that a valid patent exists on the
invention."
In addition, Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement sets
forth that the use of compulsory licensing should be
"predominantly for the supply of the domestic market."" The
obligation of Article 31(f) imposes hardships upon countries with
insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in making effective use
of the compulsory licensing scheme." One implication of Article
31(f), for example, is that a country without manufacturing
capacity, even if it were to issue compulsory licensing, would not
be able to obtain the necessary medicine from another country
with compulsory licensing where it is manufactured to serve its
domestic market." Thus, even if a compulsory license is granted,
a country without manufacturing capacity might not have any
practical way of obtaining the necessary medicine at a competitive
price.
11 See id. art. 31(h), 31(i).
12 Id. art. 31(b).
'3 Id.
14 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 3 1(b).
15 Id. art. 31 (f).
16 See Decision of 30 Aug. 2003, supra note 3, at pmbl.
17 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 31(f).
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The Paragraph 6 System attempts to solve this issue by
allowing the use of compulsory licensing for exportation purposes
by "waiving" two major restrictions placed on the use of
compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement.1 8
First, with respect to an exporting country, the Paragraph 6
System waives the "predominantly for the domestic market"
requirement of Article 31(f) 19 This allows a country with
manufacturing capacities in which a medicine may be protected by
a valid patent to produce the medicine legally at a price below the
price set by the patent holder for the purpose of exportation to an
eligible importing country.
Secondly, the Paragraph 6 System waives the "adequate
remuneration" requirement of Article 31(h) with respect to an
eligible importing country.20 Adequate remuneration pursuant to
Article 31(h) is to be paid by a generic drug supplier in the
exporting county, "taking into account the economic value to the
[eligible] importing Member."2 ' Thus, the generic drug supplier or
the exporting nation is in charge of determining the royalty rate
paid to the patent holder.
The Paragraph 6 System does not waive the prior
negotiation requirement of Article 31(b), mentioned above.
Accordingly, an entity in the importing country must seek a
voluntary license from the patent holder prior to obtaining a
compulsory license from the government of an exporting
country.22
Moreover, in determining the eligibility of a country as an
importing member, any least-developed country is "deemed to
have insufficient or no manufacturing capacity in the
pharmaceutical sector." 23 However, other countries can become
18 Decision of 30 Aug. 2003, supra note 3, 2.
19 Id.
20 Id. 3.
21 Id.
22 See CARLOS M. CORREA, WHO, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WTO GENERAL
CouNctL DECISION ON PARAGRAPH 6 OF THE DOHA DECLARATION ON THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT AND PUBLIC HEALTH 41 (2004).
23 Decision of 30 Aug. 2003, supra note 3, at annex.
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eligible by notifying the TRIPS Council of its lack of or
insufficient manufacturing capacity.2 4
The Annex of the Decision of 30 August 2003 regarding
Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration of the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health by the TRIPS Council states
the following:
For other eligible importing Members[,] insufficient or no
manufacturing capacities for the product(s) in question
may be established in either of the following ways:
(i) the Member in question has established that it has no
manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector; OR
(ii) where the Member has some manufacturing capacity in
this sector, it has examined this capacity and found that,
excluding any capacity owned or controlled by the patent
owner, it is currently insufficient for the purposes of
meeting its needs. When it is established that such
capacity has become sufficient to meet the Member's
needs, the system shall no longer apply.2 5
The above-mentioned notification does not need to be
approved by a WTO body.2 6 Thus, it may be characterized as a
naked self-declaration. However, twenty-three developed
countries gave assurances to the TRIPS Council that they would
refrain from using the system as an importing country.2 7 in
addition, ten nations within the European Union, Hong Kong,
Israel, Korea, Kuwait, Macao China, Mexico, Qatar, Singapore,
Taiwan, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates declared that they
would not use the system, except in the case of "national
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency." 28 This list
suggests that the intended recipients of the system are largely
least-developed countries.
24 CORREA, supra note 22, at 17.
25 Decision of 30 Aug. 2003, supra note 3, at annex.
26 Id. 1 1(b) n. 2.
27 Id. 1(b) n. 3. The nations that agreed not to use the system as importing
countries were Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. Id.
28 CORREA, supra note 22, at 12.
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The Paragraph 6 System also sets forth additional
procedural requirements, including providing a notice to the
TRIPS Council,29 clearly identifying the exported medicine with
specific labeling or marking,30 and taking "reasonable measures
within [the importing country's] means" to prevent the diversion
of the imported pharmaceutical products to other countries.'
While the Decision of 30 August 2003 originally
established the Paragraph 6 System as an interim waiver, 32 it is
currently being offered in the form of a 2005 Protocol to amend
the TRIPS Agreement permanently, which would require
ratification by two thirds of the 153 WTO members. As of
February 2010, only 26 member countries, counting the European
Communities as one member, have acted to accept the 2005
Protocol formally.34
III. Events Leading to Implementation of the Paragraph 6
System
To understand the necessity of the Paragraph 6 System
properly, it is important to examine the historical events that have
led to its implementation.
A. Transition from Paris Convention to the TRIPS Agreement
Prior to adoption of the TRIPS Agreement, the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property ("Paris
Convention") of 1883, within the World Intellectual Property
Organization ("WIPO"), provided the framework for international
29 See Decision of 30 Aug. 2003, supra note 3, 2(a) n. 5.
30 Id. 2(b)(ii).
31 Id. 4; see also CORREA, supra note 22, at 16 (outlining the purpose and
expectations of "anti-diversion measures" to be taken by the importing countries).
32 See CORREA, supra note 22, at 5.
33 WTO Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, TRIPS
Council Minutes, 27-28 October and 6 November 2009, IP/C/M/61, issued 12 February
2010, 1 102 [hereinafter TRIPS Council Minutes]; see generally Frederick M. Abbott &
Rudolf V. Van Puymbroeck, Compulsory Licensing for Public Health: A Guide and
Model Documents for Implementation of the Doha Declaration Paragraph 6 Decision
(World Bank, Working Paper No. 61, 2005).
34 TRIPS Council Minutes, supra note 33, 102.
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intellectual property protection. The Paris Convention provided
a greater flexibility to its member countries than the TRIPS
Agreement with regard to the patent protection of
pharmaceuticals.3 6 Under the Paris Convention, member nations
were not required to provide patent protection for "all fields of
technology," and many countries chose to exclude pharmaceutical
products from patent protection altogether.3 ' Further, the patent
term varied from state to state, and the failure to work a patent
locally within a country-for example, to manufacture the
patented product inside the country-was considered a valid
ground for granting a compulsory license.
To highlight some of the flexibilities afforded under the
Paris Convention, the patent law of India can be examined in
detail. Pursuant to its Patents Act of 1970,39 which purposely
weakened intellectual property protection for pharmaceuticals,
India did not grant product patents for pharmaceuticals, food
products or agrochemicals from the early 1970s until mid-2000s.4 0
Only process patents were available for these subject matters.4 1 in
addition, the patent term for pharmaceutical process patents was
purposefully shortened to five years from the initial grant of seven
years from the filing, whichever came first, and licensing was
granted automatically for pharmaceutical patents at an
35 K. Balasubramaniam, Patent Policies and Pharmaceutical Prices, Lecture
delivered to Post Graduate Diploma in Health Development, Faculty of Medicine,
University of Colombo (Oct. 16, 2004), in TRIPS AND PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY:
IMPACT ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 15, 16-17 (Manish Ashiya ed., 2007).
36 Id.
37 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as
rev'd Dec. 14, 1900, June 2, 1911, Nov. 6, 1925, June 2, 1934, Oct. 31, 1958, July 14,
1967, Sept. 28, 1979 [hereinafter Paris Convention]; see also RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS
AND DEVELOPMENT 353 (UNCTAD-ICTSD ed., Cambridge University Press 2005).
38 See generally, RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 37, at
482-83 (referencing the relationship of the TRIPS Agreement with Articles 5.A.2 and
5.A.4 of the Paris Convention).
39 The Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970; INDIA CODE (1999), available
at http://www.patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/patActl 970-3-99.html.
40 See Jean 0. Lanjouw, The Introduction of Pharmaceutical Product Patents in
India: "Heartless Exploitation of the Poor and Suffering? 3 (Economic Growth Center
of Yale University, Center Discussion Paper No. 775, 1997).
41 Id. at app. II.
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exceptionally low royalty rate of 4%.42 In fact, many countries
were offering patent terms that ranged from fifteen to seventeen
years for product patents, and seven to ten years for process
patents, under the Paris Convention.43
The Indian Patents Act of 1970 allowed the Indian
domestic pharmaceutical sector to grow rapidly, transforming the
nearly foreign-dominated India pharmaceutical market of the
1970s to a primarily domestic market.44 By the mid-1990s, 70%
of domestically consumed drug in bulk was produced by domestic
companies. 45 Indian generic drug manufacturers flourished in this
environment by producing, often by reverse engineering,
pharmaceutical products protected in most developed countries at
that time, thus quickly emerging as an important international
source of generic drugs.46 The Indian Patent Act suggests that
different levels of intellectual property protection may actually
favor a given country, depending on its unique economic
developmental phase.
The flexibilities permitted under the Paris Convention were
eliminated in 1995, when the WTO adopted the TRIPS
Agreement. 47 The TRIPS Agreement established a high global
minimum standard of intellectual property protection in "all fields
of technology" except for "diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical
methods for the treatment of humans or animals."' 8 WTO member
42 Id.
43 See Balasubramaniam, supra note 35, at 18.
44 See Lanjouw, supra note 40, at 4.
45 Id.
46 See Pervez N. Ghauri, Intellectual Property, Pharmaceutical MiVEs and the
Developing World, 44 JOURNAL OF WORLD BUSINESS 206, 208 (2009) (explaining that
six developed countries account for 90% of patents, with the U.S. accounting for half of
the total); Nicoli Nattras, The (Political) Economics of Antiretroviral Treatment in
Developing Countries, 16 TRENDS IN MICROBIOLOGY 574, 574 (2008) (noting that
reverse-engineering is one of several modes by which many generic drugs are produced
in Brazil and India); Richard Smith, Trade, TRIPS, and Pharmaceuticals, 373 THE
LANCET 684, 685 (2009). Brazil, Thailand and India have substantial capacity to
produce generics; India became an important generic drug supplier for the developing
world by not providing patents on medicines until 2005. Id.
47 See World Health Org., Intellectual Property Protection: Impact on Public
Health 19 WHO DRUG INFO. 236,238 (2005).
48 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 27.1, 27.3(a).
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nations were obligated to grant patents for pharmaceutical
products. 49 Also, in line with the contemporaneous U.S. Patent
Act and the European Patent Convention of 1973, the patent term
was extended to twenty years, not fifteen to seventeen years, as it
had been in many developing countries at the time.so The TRIPS
Agreement also required that product patents be granted for
pharmaceuticals, in addition to process patents, eliminating the
option of using reverse engineering to produce a patent-protected
compound with a process not covered by the process patent.
This requirement would eventually have a major impact on the
availability of generic drugs, as explained below.
Further, the TRIPS Agreement required that the "patent
rights [be] enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of
invention, the field of technology and whether products are
imported or locally produced." 52 In effect, the Agreement
eliminated the local working requirement as valid grounds for
granting compulsory licenses. " Brazil and other mid-income
countries have advocated local production as part of its efforts to
increase technology transfer.5 4
Because the national law of each member differed
significantly at the time of its adoption, as well as the economic
status and specific needs of each nation, the TRIPS Agreement
sets forth a schedule of transition periods for compliance,
dependent upon the economic status of each member nation, as
designated by the United Nations." For example, some of the
mid-income developing countries, including India, were allowed
to defer compliance until 2005, while the least-developed
countries, such as Rwanda, were allowed a longer transition
period.5 6
49 See World Health Org., supra note 47, at 238.
50 Balasubramaniam, supra note 35, at 18.
51 Id.
52 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 27.1.
53 See Cicero Gontijo, Changing the Patent System from the Paris Convention to
the TRIPS Agreement: The Position of Brazil 23 (Heinrich Bill Foundation, Global
issue Paper No. 26 May 2005).
54 Id.
55 See HESTERMEYER, supra note 8, at 70.
56 Id. at 70-72 (discussing the details of TRIPS compliance schedules); TRIPS
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B. Impact of AIDS Epidemic in Refining the TRIPS
Agreement
The discussion regarding the events leading to the
implementation of the Paragraph 6 System would not be complete
without considering the role that the Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome ("AIDS") epidemic and the development of
antiretroviral drugs had played in shaping the TRIPS Agreement.57
The AIDS epidemic was first recognized in the United
States in the early 1980s with isolated incidences of a mysterious
and deadly new disease, predominantly occurring among the
homosexual population." This disease was referred to as AIDS
for the very first time in 1982.59
In 1983, the Human Immunodeficiency Virus ("HIV") was
identified as the cause of AIDS. 60 In the United States, the
research effort for finding a cure started immediately. " In
particular, Burroughs-Wellcome PLC, now GlaxoSmithKline
("GSK"),62 and the U.S. National Cancer Institute ("NCI"), a part
of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, played a
major role in developing the very first antiretroviral drug indicated
for treating AIDS. 63 GSK's research, which began in 1983,
resulted in Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") approval of
the first antiretroviral medicine for treating HIV, Retrovir,64 in
1987.6' FDA approval was followed by the patent grant for its
Agreement, supra note 1, art. 65.4.
57 HESTERMEYER, supra note 8, at 255-56 (explaining that limited access to AIDS
medication put pressure on the WTO before the Doha Agreement).
58 See ALVIN SILVERSTEIN, VIRGINIA SILVERSTEIN & LAURA SILVERSTEIN NUNN,
THE AIDS UPDATE 19-22 (1st ed., 2008) (discussing the first instances that doctors
encountered before AIDS was identified).
59 Id. at 23.
60 Id. at 25.
61 See James Cochrane, Zidovudine's Patent History, 356 THE LANCET 1611, 1611
(2000) (indicating that Burroughs-Wellcome started researching compounds in 1983).
62 See Samuel Broder, The Development of Antiretroviral Therapy and its Impact
on the HIV-1/AIDS Pandemic, 85 ANTIVIRAL RES. 1, 1 (2010) (explaining the
significance of the company's change in name).
63 Cochrane, supra note 61, at 1611-12 (discussing the collaboration between the
two institutions).
64 RETROVIR, Registration No. 1418913.
2010] 147
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
active ingredient, zidovudine, in February 1988.6 This patent
expired in 2005.7
However, it took until 1996 for "highly active anti-
retroviral therapy" ("HAART") to emerge.68 In its current form,
HAART is now considered a powerful treatment that combines
two nucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitors with a protease
inhibitor, or non-nucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitor. 9
Between 1985 and 1996, GSK and various other
researchers in the U.S. and Europe developed several more
compounds belonging to the same category of medicine as
zidovudine.70 These compounds were referred to as nucleoside
reverse transcriptase inhibitors for their effect of suppressing HIV,
a retrovirus, from replicating itself by inhibiting the reverse
transcription of its genome through the process of nucleoside
analog substitution." GSK obtained FDA approval for its second
nucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitor for AIDS, lamivudine, in
1995.72
In 1995, the first approved protease inhibitor, saquinavir,
was developed by Hoffinann-La Roche,' a Swiss pharmaceutical
company.74 Protease inhibitors suppress replication of a virus by
inhibiting the activity of a viral protease, "an enzyme that cuts
65 See Broder, supra note 62, at 3 tbl. 1 (detailing the approval date and length of
research).
66 Cochrane, supra note 61, at 1612.
67 HESTERMEYER, supra note 8, at 6.
68 K. Porter et al., Determinants of Survival Following HIV-1 Seroconversion After
the Introduction ofHAART, 362 THE LANCET 1267, 1267 (2003).
69 Thomas Cihlar & Adrian S. Ray, Nucleoside and Nucleotide HIV Reverse
Transcriptave Inhibitors: 25 Years After Zidovudine, 85 ANTIVIRAL REs. 39,43 (2010).
70 See Broder, supra note 62, at 3 tbl. 2 (showing a list of approved antiviral
medications).
71 See Cihlar, supra note 69, at 40 (describing the development of zidovudine).
72 See Kanikaram Satyanarayana & Sadhana Srivastava, Patent Pooling for
Promoting Access to Antiretroviral Durgs (ARVs) - A Strategic Option for India, 4 THE
OPEN AIDS J. 41, 42 tbl. 1 (2010) (showing a list of all approved antiviral drugs).
73 Broder, supra note 62, at 3 tbl. 1.
74 Hoffmann-La Roche, Company Portrait, RocHE,
http://www.roche.com/aboutroche/at_a-glance/company_portrait.htm (last visited Oct.
28, 2010).
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long protein strands into functional viral proteins."" Reverse
transcriptase inhibitors and protease inhibitors are much less
effective when administered separately."
In 1996, by combining a protease inhibitor discovered by
Hoffmann-La Roche with two nucleoside reverse transcriptase
inhibitors in a clinical study with 862 individuals, the modem
form of antiretroviral treatment, HAART, was introduced for the
first time.7 7 HAART proved to be a powerful treatment for AIDS,
reducing the mortality rate by 84% within four years of its
introduction in developed countries."
C. Doha Declaration and Callfor the Paragraph 6 System
By 2000, the AIDS epidemic had spread worldwide.7 9
Further, it had quickly become clear that the HAART treatment,
which had significantly reduced the mortality rate of AIDS in
developed countries, remained prohibitively expensive for many
living in the least-developed countries."
Under the "Accelerating Access" initiative, a program
funded by the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
("UNAIDS"), some pharmaceutical companies volunteered to
provide antiretroviral treatments at a reduced price to African
countries, where approximately "25 million people [were] infected
with HIV."' However, by February 2001, only three countries-
Senegal, Uganda, and Rwanda-had reached a drug distribution
agreement with the pharmaceutical companies.8 2 In Senegal, the
75 SILVERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 58, at 119.
76 See HESTERMEYER, supra note 8, at 8 (explaining the effectiveness of the
combined treatment compared to the downsides of using only one of the drugs).
77 See Porter et al., supra note 68, at 1267.
78 AVERT, AIDS, Drug Prices and Generic Drugs, AVERT,
http://www.avert.org/generic.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2010).
79 See AVERT, AIDS Timeline, AVERT, http://www.avert.org/aids-timeline.htm
(last visited Sep. 9, 2010) (describing the spread of AIDS, which had reached all regions
by 1985, and had infected an estimated 22 million people in 1999).
80 See AVERT, supra note 78 (describing the cost of AIDS treatment in Sub-
Saharan Africa).
81 Marwaan Macan-Markar, Generic-Drug Makers Brace for Battle with
Pharmaceutical Industry, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Feb. 11, 2001
http://www.aegis.com/news/ips/2001/IP010205.html.
82 Id.
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agreement lowered the price of annual treatment per person to
approximately $1000 - $1800, approximately 10% of the U.S.
price for the same medicine." Even with the 90% reduction in
price, the treatment was still too expensive for many Africans to
afford, and the limited supply did not go far in the face of the
shortage confronting the developing countries.8 4
South Africa was particularly devastated, where
approximately 20% of its adult population carried HIV, and 600
people were dying from AIDS each day." In what was called the
"defiance campaign," the Treatment Action Campaign ("TAC"), a
non-governmental organization based in South Africa, imported
generic fluconazole, a meningitis medicine crucial in treating
many AIDS patients, from Thailand to South Africa in open
violation of South African patent law in 2000.86 At that time, the
South African government was negotiating for price concession of
fluconazole with Pfizer." TAC openly blamed the South African
government for 600 people dying from AIDS each day, and urged
the government to take a humanitarian exemption and to import
generic drugs under its Medicines Amendment Act of 1997."
In the meantime, Cipla Limited, an Indian generic drug
manufacturer, had been targeting the African market and offering
African countries antiretroviral treatments at a price far below the
reduced rates offered by the brand-name pharmaceutical
83 Id.
84 See HESTERMEYER, supra note 8, at 9 (discussing a 2005 study that showed that
80% of those who needed the drugs in developing countries has no access to them).
85 Verity Murphy, Mbeki Stirs Up Aids Controversy, BBC NEWS Sept. 26, 2003,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3143850.stm; Access to Essential Medicines in the Age
of HIV, EQUAL TREATMENT: MAGAZINE OF THE TREATMENT ACTION CAMPAIGN, June
2010, at 14, available at
http://www.tac.org.za/community/files/file/etmag/ET33/ET33English.pdf [hereinafter
Equal Treatment].
86 Id. at 38; John S. James, South Africa: Historic "Defiance Campaign" Imports
Generic Fluconazole, AIDS TREATMENT NEWS, Oct. 20, 2000,
http://www.thebody.com/content/art32050.html.
87 James, supra note 86.
88 Deepak Gupta The Neoliberal Case for South African Patent Defiance, in TRIPS
AND PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: IMPACT ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 37, 38 (Manish
Ashiya ed., 2007).
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companies. ' While the South African government was
considering the option of obtaining the necessary medicines under
compulsory licenses, Cipla approached the South African
government, asked for a unilateral license in the case that a
compulsory license was granted, and offer to provide the supply at
a five percent royalty rate.90
In response to Cipla's offer, in April 2001, thirty-nine
pharmaceutical companies jointly brought a lawsuit against the
South African government, claiming that South Africa's
Medicines Amendment Act of 1997 violated the TRIPS
Agreement. 9' Due to public outcry, this lawsuit was eventually
dropped. 92 However, the debate among the international
community regarding the TRIPS Agreement had reached its
pinnacle.93
In November 2001, the heated debate led to the Doha
Declaration, which clarified the terms of the TRIPS Agreement
with respect to parallel importation and compulsory licensing.9 4
Particularly important for understanding the Paragraph 6 System is
paragraph 5 of the Doha Declaration, which specifies that "[e]ach
member has the right to grant compulsory licenses and the
freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licenses are
granted." 95 Further, Doha paragraph 6 states that:
We recognize that WTO Members with insufficient or no
manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector
could face difficulties in making effective use of
compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement. We
89 Charles Miller & Kenneth Goldman, Merck, AIDS, and Africa, in TRIPS AND
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: IMPACT ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 86, 88 (Manish
Ashiya ed., 2007).
90 Id. at 88-89.
91 Id. at 91.
92 Id. at 90.
93 HESTERMEYER, supra note 8, at 9-15.
94 Abbott, supra note 33, at 7-9; Archana Jaktar, Compulsory Licensing and the
Anti-Competitive Effects of Patents for Pharmaceutical Products: From a Developing
Countries' Perspective, Remarks at GARNET Annual Conference (Nov. I, 2009) at 12-
13 (stating that South African law suit led to Doha Declaration of 2001, which
reaffirmed the flexibilities available under TRIPS Agreement) (full text of remarks on
file with author).
95 Doha Declaration, supra note 6, 1 5(c) (emphasis added).
2010]1 151
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
instruct the Council for TRIPS to find an expeditious
solution to this problem and to report to the General
Council before the end of 2002.6
In other words, paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration
promoted the TRIPS Council members to come up with a solution
for WTO member countries that have insufficient or no
manufacturing capacities.9 7 This solution came about in 2003,
with the adoption of the Decision of 30 August 2003 regarding
Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration of the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health." Because this system
implements a solution for the problem identified in paragraph 6 of
the Doha Declaration, the system is now referred to as the
"Paragraph 6 System." 99
IV. First and Only Case of Utilizing the Paragraph 6 System
and Lessons Learned
The Paragraph 6 System has been used only once, by the
trade of Apo-TriAvir from Canada to Rwanda."oo Because the
Paragraph 6 System has been used only once, the Canada-Rwanda
deal provides valuable lessons regarding the strengths and
weaknesses of the Paragraph 6 System as specified under the
Decision of 30 August 2003.
The Canada-Rwanda deal would not have been possible
without the initiative taken by the Canadian government to change
its legislation. Additionally, Apotex, a Canadian generic drug
producer, took an active role in the transaction by agreeing to
supply Apo-TriAvir to Rwanda.'
96 Id. 6 (emphasis added).
97 Abbott, supra note 33, at 8-9.
98 Id. at vii.
99 Id. at 2.
100 Frederick M. Abbott, Introductory Note to World Trade Organization Canada
First Notice to Manufacture Generic Drug for Export, 46 ILM 1127, 1127 (2007)
[hereinafter Canada Notice].
101 See generally id. at 1127 (discussing the process by which Apotex came to
manufacture medication for Rwanda).
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A. Apo-TriAvir and Impact ofPatent Protection on Price
To understand the need for the Paragraph 6 System, it is
helpful to have some familiarity with the medicine involved, and
the reason that the brand-name versions of antiretroviral drugs are
so expensive.
Apo-TriAvir is a convenient, fixed-dose combination of
three different antiretroviral drugs: zidovudine, lamivudine, and
nevirapine. 102 Zidovudine (Retrovir@) was the first FDA-
approved antiretroviral for AIDS, while lamivudine was another
antiretroviral developed by GSK. 103 Nevirapine is an active
ingredient of Viramune@,10 4 marketed by Boehringer Ingelheim.'os
Once an AIDS/HIV patient has been placed on a cocktail
treatment of Apo-TriAvir, also referred to as the first-line
treatment, it is critical that the patient adhere to a consistent
medicine regimen for many years.'06 Skipping multiple doses or
discontinuing the medicine can result in drug-resistant variations
of the virus, complicating further treatment. The introduction of
fixed-dose combinations made the application of the cocktail
treatment much easier for patients to manage. "o
Apo-TriAvir is similar to GSK's Trizivir®1 os in that it is a
fixed-dose combination approved by the FDA that combines three
medications into one AIDS cocktail treatment. ' Both
102 About ApoTriavir, APOTEx, http://www.apotex.com/apotriavir/default.asp (last
visited Oct. 28, 2010).
103 Satyanarayana, supra note 72, at 42 tbl. 1.
104 VIRAMUNE, Registration No. 1905263.
105 Satyanarayana, supra note 72, at 42 tbl.1.
106 See World Health Org. [WHO], RAPID ADVICE: ANTIRETROVIRAL THERAPY FOR
HIV INFECTION IN ADULTS AND ADOLESCENTS 10-14 (1990).
107 In the United States and developing countries, simplified HIV regimens in the
form of co-packaged drugs (such as blister packs) may facilitate distribution and improve
patient adherence. See Food and Drug Administration, Fixed Dose Combination and
Co-Packaged Drug Products for Treatment of HIV: Guidance for Industry-Fixed Dose
Combination and Co-Packaged Drug Products for Treatment ofHIV 2, available at
http://www.fda.gov/Regulatorylnformation/Guidances/ucm I 25278.htm.
108 TRIZIVIR, Registration No. 2966217.
109 About ApoTriavir, supra note 102; see Prescribing Information: Trizivir,
GLAXOSMITHKLiNE, http://us.gsk.com/products/assets/us-trizivir.pdf (last visited Oct.
28, 2010).
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combinations include zidovudine and lamivudine. 110 However,
Trizivir@ costs approximately $14,600 per year, per patient in the
United States. "' Considering that a 3-year supply can cost
approximately $43,800, antiretroviral treatment is very expensive,
even for those living in the United States.1 12 Because antiretroviral
treatment can be essential to maintaining health or life for many
HIV/AIDS patients, the patent holder may exercise severely
disproportionate bargaining power when setting the price of
treatment.1 13
While debates continue as to whether patent protection
actually improves or worsens the overall quality of healthcare, it is
clear that patents impact price. With respect to the Canada-
Rwanda deal, Apotex offered to produce Apo-TriAvir at
approximately $0.405 per tablet ($295 per annual supply), as
opposed to $20 per tablet for Trizivir® in the United States
($14,600 per annual supply).
The effect of patents on the price of patented goods,
including antiretroviral treatments, can be examined using a
typical demand and supply curve.
110 About ApoTriavir, supra note 102; Prescribing Information: Trizivir, supra note
109.
111 Canada Issues Compulsory License for HI V/AIDS Drug Export to Rwanda, In
First Test of WTO Procedure, BRIDGES WEEKLY TRACE NEWS DIGEST, Sept. 26, 2007, at
5, available at http://ictsd.net/downloads/bridgesweekly/bridgesweeklyl 1-32.pdf (The
cost for brand version of Apo-TriAvir costs $20 per pill vs. $.405 from Apotex. Two
pills of this fixed dose combination are taken per day. Accordingly, $20 x 2 x 365 days
$ 14,600 per person per year).
112 See Heidi Glenn, HIV Drugs Still Unaffordable for Many, AMERICAN OBSERVER
(Dec. 2, 2006), http://americanobserver.net/2006/12/02/hiv-drugs-still-unaffordable-for-
many (discussing the cost prohibitive nature of HIV/AIDS treatment in the U.S.).
113 Ghauri, supra note 46, at 209 (arguing that the drugs are a basic need, and
patents can impose hardship in developing countries, to do inability to afford); see also
Siripen Supakankunti et al., Impact of the World Trade Organization TRIPS Agreement
on the Pharmaceutical Industry in Thailand, 79 BULL. OF THE WHO 461 (2001).
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Pm = monopoly price
Pc = competitive price
PM Deadweight loss D = demand curve
MC = marginal cost of production
F Qm = quantity supplied at Pm
E /Qc = quantity supplied at Pc
Qm Qc Qt Quantity
Because U.S. law allows patent holders to exclude others
from making, using or selling the patented product in a given
market, the patent holder has the ability to determine the market
price of the product.114 In other words, the patent holder has a
monopoly. The above economic model presumes that, as an
economic actor, the patent holder sets prices to maximize profit,
rather than to promote public health."'
The price of the medicine is set at Pm, the monopoly price
when patent protection exists, as compared to P,, the competitive
price, when no protection exists. In practice, pharmaceutical
companies might not set prices solely to maximize their profit.
Nevertheless, in the case of antiretroviral medicines, the brand-
name combinations typically cost approximately $9,000-16,000
per patient per year in the United States, while the generic drug
combinations are available at $88-261 per patient per year. 116
114 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).
115 See Dinyar Godrej, The Great Health Grab: The World's Giant Drug
Companies Pursues Profit Above All Else, NEW INTERNATIONALIST, Nov. 2003, at 9
(discussing the ways in which pharmaceutical companies control drug prices); Jaktar,
supra note 94, at 1 (discussing the use of monopoly to set prices for patented products).
116 Avert, supra note 78; WHO, UNAIDS, AND UNICEF, TOWARDS UNIVERSAL
ACCESS: SCALING UP PRIORITY HIV/AIDS INTERVENTIONS IN THE HEALTH SECTOR 74 fig.
4.13 (2009) [hereinafter UNIVERSAL ACCESS] ("The median price paid for first-line
treatment (prequalified by WHO or approved or tentatively approved by the United
States Food and Drug Administration) in low-income countries in 2008 ranged from $88
per person per year for the fixed-dose combination of 3TC + NVP + d4T (the most
widely used combination) to $261 for the fixed-dose combination EFV + [3TC +
AZT]"); see generally Mddecins Sans Frontibres, A matter of hfe and death: The role of
patents in access to essential medicines (2001), available at
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Accordingly, price bears a strong correlation to the existence of
patent protection.
Monopoly pricing is very expensive for society in general,
particularly when applied to important products like medication.
In the absence of patent protection, the quantity of medicine
supplied to society would be Q. However, due to patent
protection, only the quantity corresponding to Qm is supplied to
the society. This difference in quantity, Qc-Q m , correlates
directly to the number of people who cannot afford the necessary
treatment because of monopoly pricing. This lack of treatment
corresponds to a loss of health and life for many HIV/AIDS
patients.
Additionally, the monopolist obtains revenue equivalent to
the sum of boxes A and B as profit above the cost of production.
In particular boxes B and F correspond to consumer surplus,
which the consumer loses because of the monopoly, while box B
represents consumer surplus that has been converted into revenue
for the pharmaceutical companies. The boxes E and F represent a
deadweight loss to the society, which neither the consumer nor
any producer can capture because of the monopoly.
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/reports/2001/doha_11-2001.pdf;
Edward Gardner et al., The Association of Adherence to Antiretroviral Therapy with
Healthcare Utilization and Costs for Medical Care, 6 APPL HEALTH ECON HEALTH
POLICY 145 (2008) (noting that in the high adherence quartile, antiretroviral costs were
approximately $17,513 for patients who started initial treatment between 1997 and 2003
and that the wholesale price is very high; however, certain patients in the United States
may qualify for prescription discount programs, such as the US Public Health Service
Section 340B); Sherry Boschert, Starting Antiretrovirals for Chronic HIV in Adults,
INTERNAL MEDICINE NEWS (Dec. 1, 2005),
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-hb4393/is_12_36/ai-n29240264/?tag-content;coll
(showing that recommended regimes of cocktail antiretroviral therapy wholesale price
ranged from $40.06 to 64.89 per day as of 2005); Bruce Schackman et al., The Lifetime
Cost of Current Human Immunodeficiency Virus Care in the United States, 44 MEDICAL
CARE 990 (2006) (estimating the monthly cost of first-line antiretroviral to be
approximately $1140 - $13680 per year - in 2004; further in calculating life-time cost,
cost reduction by use of generic was not applied as the "newer patent-protected drugs
were assumed to be continue to be preferred based on efficacy and convenience"); World
Health Organization, GPRM - Global Price Reporting Mechanism: Transaction prices
for Antiretroviral Medicines and HIVDiagnostics from 2008 to March 2010 (May 2010),
www.who.int/hiv/pub/amds/GPRMsummaryreport may2010.pdf (showing that many
pharmaceutical companies apply different price schemes to the least developed countries,
developing countries, and developed countries).
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When the patented and monopolized product is life-saving
medication, as it is in the case of antiretroviral treatments, the loss
of consumer surplus B corresponds to other necessities of life that
a patient may forgo to obtain treatment. For example, patients and
their families may consume a substantial portion of their life
savings in order to obtain the necessary treatments for their
sickness. In fact, in developed countries where access to medicine
exists regardless of the person's economic status, the total quantity
supplied may be close to the total quantity necessary, regardless of
the price of the medicine. In such a case, the national government
may end up paying for a substantial portion of the monopoly rent
A and B to the pharmaceutical company.
The public health impact can be far more severe in
countries where access to medicine is not guaranteed. A large
portion of the population could be excluded from access
altogether, as has happened in many African countries in the early
2000s.
B. Cost ofDeveloping New Medicine
Nevertheless, most developed countries have supported the
patent protection of pharmaceuticals.' The rent A and B to the
brand-name pharmaceutical producers, according to the developed
countries, is the source of funds necessary for the research and
development (R&D) of new drugs. Development can be
extremely costly and risky for those who undertake it.
117 See generally Decision of 30 Aug. 2003, supra note 3 (describing agreement of
twenty-three developed countries in support of pharmaceutical patent protection).
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Developed countries, in particular the U.S., bear a large
portion of the world's R&D costs for new drugs."'s It is estimated
that, while 80% of world population lives in the developing
countries, people in developing countries represent only 10% of
world pharmaceutical sales revenue. 119 The size of the
pharmaceutical market in several developed countries can be
glanced at a graph from Jane Parry's article "Intellectual Property
and the Challenges of China," reproduced below.'20
A BOOMING PHARMACEUTICAL MARKET
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In 2005, the U.S. alone spent $262 billion on over-the-
counter ("OTC") drugs. 12 ' Furthermore, the U.S. market is larger
than the next nine markets combined: Japan, Germany, France,
China, England, Brazil, Italy, Canada and Spain. 122 In other
118 Ghauri, supra note 46, at 209 (noting that Argentina, Brazil, India, and Mexico
have developed a thriving generic industry in the absence of patent protection).
119 Godrej, supra note 115, at 10; Smith, supra note 46, at 685 (providing recent
global pharmaceutical sales data; North America, Europe, Japan, and Latin America
account for 85% of the global pharmaceutical market, which leaves only 15% for the rest
of the world).
120 Jane Parry, Intellectual Property and the Challenge of China, THE SCIENTIST,
May 23, 2005, at 41.
121 Id.
122 See id.
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words, a substantial portion of the market is concentrated in the
United States, Europe, and a handful of other developed countries.
For the brand-name pharmaceutical companies, the countries
outside the top ten markets, including most mid-income and least-
developed countries, comprise only a small fraction of their
overall revenue. 123 Sub-Saharan Africa, where two-thirds of
world's HIV/AIDS patients live, accounted for only about 1% of
the global pharmaceutical market in 2001.124
The cost of R&D and the necessity of patent protection for
new drugs can be better understood by studying the resources that
GSK-and the U.S. government-used in developing the first
antiretroviral, zidovudine (Retrovir@).
The financial statement provided by GSK to its
stockholders reveals that GSK spent approximately $50 million to
develop zidovudine.12 5 Furthermore, GSK actually spent about
$726 million to research about a dozen other drugs before
Retrovir@ resulted in a commercial success.12 6 Thus, in making
Retrovir@, GSK recouped financial losses from other unsuccessful
ventures.127
Additionally, the production costs remained high for GSK
during the initial years of Retrovir@ production: by receiving FDA
approval, the company committed itself to spending tens of
millions of dollars on materials and equipment. 128 Cheaper
alternatives did not exist because, as the first producer of new
pharmaceutical compounds, GSK could not obtain a large quantity
of cheap intermediates, which are available to generic producers.
Moreover, the initial market for antiretroviral treatment remained
small, while the fixed costs associated with producing each unit of
the medicine remained high. 129 These factors, in addition to
123 Godrej, supra note 115, at 10.
124 John H. Barton, TRIPS and the Global Pharmaceutical Market, HEALTH
AFFAIRS, May-Jun. 2004, at 146, 150.
125 Brian O'Reilly, The Inside Story of the AIDS Drug, FORTUNE, Nov. 5, 1990, at
112, 124.
126 O'Reilly, supra note 125, at 124.
127 See Sabine Vollmer, Cheaper AZT on the Way, NEWS & OBSERVER, Sept. 18,
2005, at A8.
128 O'Reilly, supra note 125, at 124.
129 Id.
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clinical studies that must be conducted, contribute to the price
difference between a brand-name drug and its generic versions.
GSK's financial statement demonstrates that new drug
development is very expensive and highly risky. 30 If a company
invests several million dollars in an ultimately unsuccessful
compound, that company can quickly lose its economic holding.
The revenue secured by the patent protection guarantees that some
pharmaceutical companies can recoup the cost of R&D. These
companies can even make a profit above and beyond the costs, by
attracting the best prospects for new drug development.
Developing a new drug now costs approximately $115-802
million for the pharmaceutical industry. 131 Additionally,
substantial spending on basic science research and time-
consuming trial and error cannot be avoided.'3 2 The United States,
for example, spent about $170 billion on R&D in 1995, and about
35% of the funding came from the federal government.' 33 Without
the structured support for R&D that exists in developed countries
like the U.S., the discovery of powerful new medications, such as
zidovudine and Apo-TriAvir, most likely would not have
occurred. " Advocates of the patent system argue that the
streamline of continuous development and discovery of better
medication over time enriches the public domain with new and
better drugs that were not available only a few decades ago.3 5
130 See David Cavalla, Does R&D pay?, DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY, March 2010, at
230.
131 HESTERMEYER, supra note 8, at xxxiii.
132 See generally Broder, supra note 62, at 2-6 (outlining the various difficulties
inherent to HIV treatment research).
133 See Adam B. Jaffe, Trends and Patterns in Research and Development
Expenditures in the United States, 93 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. OF ScI. OF U.S. 12658, 12658
(1996).
134 See generally Broder, supra note 62 (discussing the success of the R&D
model-including the FDA's involvement-used in developing antiretroviral
medications).
135 Broder, supra note 62, at 1-5 (characterizing the development of the first
antiretroviral treatment as "treating the untreatable," and noting that scientific advance
saves lives; these life saving discoveries occur through continual researches and
development, and allocating resources for that purpose is crucial for developing new and
better treatments for AIDS.); HESTERMEYER, supra note 8, at 29-33 (noting that patents
have been traditionally used as a mechanism of rewarding inventors for their useful
innovations for a limited time, on the basis that it spurs innovation). Henry Grabowski,
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C. Rwanda and Other Eligible Importing Countries
The economic condition of Rwanda, which was the
importing country in the landmark Canada-Rwanda deal, sheds
some light regarding on the condition of many least-developed
countries that are battling the AIDS epidemic.
While the GDP per capita of Rwanda is approximately
$1000 per year, the majority of Rwandans live below the poverty
line, earning approximately 250 Rwandan francs per day, which
amounts to approximately $157 per year or $ 0.43 per day.'36 The
prevalence of AIDS in the adult Rwandan population (age fifteen
to forty-nine) is 2.8%,1'3 with approximately 150,000 people living
with HIV in Rwanda as of 2007. 13' The prevalence rate is high
among many African countries, with sub-Saharan Africa home to
Patents, Innovation and Access to New Pharmaceuticals, 5 OXFORD JOURNAL OF INT'L
ECON. L. 849 (2002) (stating that new drug development involves undertaking high risks
and allocating large amount of resources, and points out that a mechanism for recouping
the resource is essential to support the pharmaceutical industry); Gregory J. Glover, The
Influence of Market Exclusivity on Drug Availability and Medical Innovations, 9 THE
AAPS JOURNAL E312 (2007) (noting that while the United States intellectual property
law might not be perfect, intellectual property protection plays an important role in
spurring the development of new drugs and of delivering the drugs to the general public);
David Cavalla, supra note 130 (explaining the risks of pharmaceutical R&D, the impact
of patent expiration on large pharmaceutical companies, and their long-term capital gain);
Smith, supra note 46, at 685 ("Information is a public good, meaning that it is impossible
to exclude anyone from consuming it once it is produced, providing no market incentive
for its production. Intellectual-property rights-and patents more specifically-grant
legal excludability to information to remove this disincentive. Patents have been
mainstay of policy to ensure investment in pharmaceutical research and development,
acting as guarantor of monopoly rents."); MERILL GOOZNER, THE $800 MILLION PILL:
THE TRUTH BEHIND THE COST OF NEW DRUGS 3-8 (2004) (estimating that developing a
new drug now costs approximately $800 million or more, and stating the pharmaceutical
companies argue that without the funds to spend in research and development, they will
lose the competitive edge in new drug market and will cease to exist, as research funding
is not optional for discovering a new drug); Archana Jaktar, supra note 94, at 2 (noting
that intellectual property rights protection is "a policy tool meant to foster innovation,
which benefits consumers through the development of new and improved goods and
services).
136 CIA World Factbook, Rwanda Statistical Data, available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rw.html (noting that
250 Rwandan francs per day-about US$0.43-is the income for the majority of
Rwandans).
137 Id.
138 UNAIDS, 2008 Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic, 215 annex 1 (2008).
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approximately 22 million people infected with HIV. 139 This
number amounts to about two-thirds of people infected with HIV
in the world.'4 0
Given that generic antiretroviral treatments cost about $88-
261 per year, the treatments are not affordable even at their
competitive price to a large majority of people living in Rwanda.
The cost of brand-name antiretroviral treatment ($10,000 per year)
is even higher. By the end of 2008 the WHO estimated that about
58% of people who need treatment in sub-Saharan Africa are not
receiving it.'4 '
Income disparity tends to exaggerate the problem of
prohibitively expensive treatment in many countries with the
greatest need for antiretroviral medicine. It has been estimated
that the top 20% of earners in South Africa earn twenty-two times
as much as the bottom 20% of earners.'4 2 In Brazil, the top 10% of
earners makes about 48% of total income, as compared to about
41% in Mexico, about 30% in United States, and about 24% in
Canada.143
139 Id. at 39.
140 Id.
141 UNIVERSAL ACCESS, supra note 116. This report includes estimated numbers of
people (all ages) and children younger than 15 years receiving and needing antiretroviral
therapy and antiretrovirals for preventing mother-to-child transmission and coverage.
Id.
142 Ian F. Ferguson, The WTO, Intellectual Property Rights, and the Access to
Medicines Controversy, in TRIPS AND PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: IMPACT ON
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 26, 28 (Manish Ashiya ed., 2007).
I43 Id.
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The effect of income disparity can be studied graphically
in the following hypothetical model:
-* Economy A .2 j k Economy B
Consumer Surplus Consumer Surplus
Market exclusion Market exclusion
Pmn 
---ei._tlsPm-Deadweight losD lmss
FcPC PC- -
FE
ewight loss
Qm Qc Qt Quantity Qm Qc Qt Quantity
Income disparity results in an L-shaped demand curve,
making the price impact of a monopoly more pronounced, as
illustrated in Economy B in the above demand curves. 14
Significantly fewer people are able to afford antiretroviral
medicine in countries with high income disparity, as a large
portion of the population remains in poverty.
Further, the above graph presumes that the pricing of Pm in
Economy A, set by a brand-name pharmaceutical company to
maximize its profit in a hypothetical developed country (Economy
A), supplies to a hypothetical least-developed country with
significant income disparity (Economy B). This presumption is
realistic in view of international protection of patent rights. This
protection allows the pharmaceutical companies to set prices in
both developed and under-developed economies. Such price-
setting behavior may be detrimental to those living in the least-
developed countries by making treatment cost prohibitive.
144 Id. at 50-52.
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Economy B .8 Economy B'
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Provided that the least-developed country forms a
completely closed economy in which price is determined by its
own demand and supply, as shown in the above demand curve for
a hypothetical Economy B', the monopoly price of the medicine,
Pm', would be set lower than Pm, the monopoly price established
to maximize profit in a developed Economy A. Accordingly,
allowing the pharmaceutical manufacturers to set prices in both
the developed and least-developed country may lower the number
of people who can access treatment in the least-developed country.
In the Rwanda-Canada deal, the problem of price carryover
from hypothetical Economy A to hypothetical Economy B
manifests itself in the form of the buying power of international
currency. As stated above, the majority of people in Rwanda
make about 250 Rwandan francs per day, which converts to about
$0.43 per day.
The 250 Rwandan francs, though small, is a sufficient
amount of income for Rwandan residents to obtain necessities for
one day; for example, a kilogram of Irish potatoes costs about 230
Rwandan francs. 4 5 When converted to U.S. dollars, 250 Rwandan
francs are not sufficient to buy a bottle of orange juice in the
U.S. 146 Because the cheapest generic antiretroviral treatments
from India cost $0.24-1.00 per day, a majority of Rwanda
145 See Saul Butera, Food Prices in Kigali Rise, ALL AFRICA, May 15, 2009,
http://allafrica.com/stories/200905150422.html.
146 See The Associated Press, Tropicana Orange Juice Raising Prices, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 11, 2010, at B6 (noting that the price of a 59-ounce bottle of orange juice is $3.59,
which is much more than the $0.43 that corresponds to 250 Rwandan francs).
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residents cannot afford these treatments without some type of
governmental or humanitarian aid.
In an international context, local currency conversion
involves a vicious cycle of trade deficit and weakening national
economies: no easy solution exists.' 4 7 Because pharmaceutical
companies can set prices for least-developed nations based on
their profits in developed nations, the "local working requirement"
as a ground for granting compulsory licensing has been a major
loss for the developing countries. 148 Domestic productions of
drugs might provide a greater chance of the drugs becoming
affordable within the country. Additionally, domestic production
in least-developed nations can help those countries obtain a
technology transfer that would foster the growth of their domestic
pharmaceutical sectors.149
The irony of the situation lies in the fact that supplying
generic drugs or even free humanitarian aid to least-developed
countries is not likely to affect pharmaceutical companies' brand-
name profits greatly, provided the medication is not rerouted to
another market."1o As illustrated by the graphs above, a large
147 Smith, supra note 46, at 684-85 (noting that the global pharmaceutical market is
substantial in size (valued at $650 billion in 2006) and that because developing countries
often do not produce the brand-name drugs and are forced to pay high prices to
pharmaceutical producers in developed countries, many developing countries exhibit a
trade deficit in modem medicine); see also HESTERMEYER, supra note 8, at 146-147.
Pharmaceutical patents can be a source of significant rent transfer from developing
countries to developed countries as those who are ill seek to obtain available treatment at
high costs. Id.
148 HESTERMEYER, supra note 8, at 242 (noting that the Paris Convention recognized
failure to work as a valid ground for granting compulsory license (Article 5A(2)));
Article 27 of TRIPS has been considered by some as eliminating the local working
requirement by stating that no discrimination should be applied as to whether the
products are imported or locally produced); see also Cicero Gontijo, supra note 53, at
23.
149 HESTERMEYER, supra note 8, at 242-244.
150 Ghauri, supra note 46, at 209 (noting that the health expenditure markets in
developing countries are small in comparison to that of developed countries; in many
countries, a vast majority of the population cannot afford the drug, and it follows that
forfeiting the market will not make big monetary difference to big pharmaceutical
companies' revenues); John H. Barton, supra note 124 (arguing that the pharmaceutical
"market in poor countries is so small that it provides only a minimal incentive [to supply
medicines in those countries]-the total market of the poorest countries (for example,
sub-Saharan Africa or the United Nations' Least Developed Countries) is on the order of
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percentage of people living in the least-developed countries
currently belong to the Qc-Qt zone in the demand curve: people
who cannot afford the medicine at monopoly prices. The fact that
their market makes up only a very small faction of the total
revenue for brand-name pharmaceutical producers supports the
view that the least-developed countries should be allowed to use
the Paragraph 6 System, and other flexibilities embedded within
the TRIPS Agreement, to increase access to medicine.
D. Canada's Legislation and Apotex's Role in Exporting
Apo-TriAvir
The Canada-Rwanda deal could not have occurred without
Canada. In fact, without more countries actively changing their
own legislation to allow the use of compulsory licenses as an
exporting country, the Paragraph 6 System cannot be utilized
effectively. In this way the Canadian effort is especially praise-
worthy, apart from the merits of its legislation. Additionally, for
countries contemplating the adoption of a national legislation for
utilizing the Paragraph 6 System, the Canada's Access to
Medicine Regime ("CAMR") is an example from which many
lessons can be learned.
As of November 2009, only a handful of countries-
Switzerland, the European Communities, and Pakistan-had
amended their national law so that the Paragraph 6 System could
be used.' 1
The effort to change Canadian patent law to allow the use
of the Paragraph 6 System started soon after the adoption of the
Decision of 30 August 2003, which implemented the Paragraph 6
System for the first time. 112 In September of 2003, Canada
became the first country to announce its intent to implement the
Paragraph 6 System. 15 3
1 percent of the global pharmaceutical market;" because the market size is very small,
supplying medicine to these countries at cost of production would not greatly impact the
originator pharmaceutical companies' profit).
151 TR[PS Council Minutes, supra note 33, at 23-25.
152 Canada Notice, supra note 100, at 1127.
153 Id.
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In May 2004, the legal framework for CAMR, as set out by
Prime Minister Jean Chrdtien's Pledge to Africa, along with a
supporting set of regulations, was passed into law by amending the
Canadian Patent Act, and the Regime came into force on May 14,
2005. 154
Several features of CAMR are worth noting to understand
fully the tasks involved in adopting national legislation that
supports the use of the Paragraph 6 System.
First, CAMR is characterized by its provision of a list of
pharmaceutical products that may be produced for exportation.'
Any medicine not included on the list can be added by a
petition."' In fact, Apo-Triavir was not on the pre-approval list,
and Apotex had to petition to add the combination."' This feature
is not entirely necessary and may create additional burdens for the
generic drug producer. 15' Thus, other nations considering the
adoption of a national legislation implementing the Paragraph 6
System should consider avoiding this approach.
In addition, as required by the Decision of 30 August 2003,
CAMR requires the applicant for a compulsory license to attempt
a negotiation for a voluntary license with the patent holder. 5 9 In
accordance with the requirements of the CAMR, Apotex contacted
the patent holders-GSK, Shire Biochem and Boehringer
Engelheim-in September 2007. 160 All of the patent holders
154 Id.; THE AIDS IN AFR. WORKING GROUP AND THE ACCESS TO DRUGS INITIATIVE,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRAM, Making Canada's Access to Medicines
Regime Work for Countries in Need: A Case Study on Ghana, (Univ. of Toronto, Jan.
2007), 3 [hereinafter Toronto].
155 See Toronto, supra note 154, at 8.
156 See Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, §21.02 and §21.03(1)(1)(Can.) [hereinafter
CAMRJ. Schedule 1 lists those drugs pre-approved for exportation. Id.
157 See generally id., at Schedule 1 (Schedule 1 reveals that Apo-TriAvir was not on
the original pre-approved list of drugs for exportation); Canada Notice, supra note 100,
at 1127.
158 See generally Toronto, supra note 154, at 8.
159 Canada Notice, supra note 100, at 1127.
160 See Kaitlin Mara, Efficacy of TRIPS Public Health Amendment In Question At
WTO, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WATCH (Mar. 1, 2010, 4:51 PM), http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/2010/03/0 1/efficacy-of-trips-public-health-amendment-in-question-at-
wto/. The TRIPS Agreements requires that in order to receive a compulsory license, the
patent holders must be contacted to see if they will grant a voluntary license. When
Apotex sought a compulsory license in Sept. 2007, Apotex had to have contacted the
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refused voluntary licensing, allowing Apotex to apply for a
compulsory license in September 2007.161 Apotex obtained the
compulsory license by October 2008.162 While this requirement is
burdensome, it cannot be eliminated from national legislation
unless the Paragraph 6 System itself is modified. However, it is
recommended that a time period be provided under which the
patent holder can challenge the compulsory licensing so that the
generic producer can conclude the trade under an assurance that its
conduct is lawful.'6 3
CAMR also provides a mechanism for determining the
royalties based on the level of economic development of the
importing country.'" This approach has been praised for its high
level of transparency.165 In the case of the Canada-Rwanda deal,
following Rwanda's petition, both GSK and Shire waived their
right to the low royalty fee determined in accordance with
Rwanda's place on the UN Human Development Index.16 6 This
royalty-determining approach reduces transactional costs by
providing the potential supplier of the generic drug with a method
of predicting royalty. Other nations may also prefer to adopt this
approach in their national legislation.
Further, as required by the Decision of 30 August 2003,
CAMR provides for a notice to be made to the TRIPS Council
regarding: (1) the product to be exported, (2) the quantity of the
drug, and (3) the importing country. 167 To provide this notice,
CAMR sets out a "drug-by-drug, country-by-country application
process," to comply with the notice requirement of the TRIPS
Council. 168
patent holders prior to this date. Id.
161 Id.
162 Id. The compulsory license was granted in May 2008, and shipment was to be
made by September 2008.
163 George Tsai, Canada's Access to Medicines Regime: Lessons for Compulsory
Licensing Schemes under the WTO Doha Declaration, 49 VA. J. INT'L L. 1063, 1082
(2009).
164 CAMR § 21.08.
165 Abbott, supra note 33, at 38.
166 Mara, supra note 160.
167 CAMR § 21.04(2)(f); Toronto, supra note 154, at 6.
168 Mara, supra note 160.
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According to Apotex, under CAMR, "the process of
obtaining a license to produce a product [for exportation] has to
restart every time a new country makes a request [for
importation]." 69 This creates a great deal of uncertainty that many
generic drug producers might not be willing to undertake; thus, an
approach that reduces the burden for the generic drug producer
should be determined. 170 For example, a system that allows
generic drug producers to apply initially without providing the
name of the importing country could better streamline the
application process.'
E. Difficulties in Using the System and Suggested
Approaches for Improvement
Several difficulties involved in using the Paragraph 6
System have been identified by the example of the Canada-
Rwanda deal. In particular, during the TRIPS Council meetings
held on October 27-28, 2009; November 6, 2009; and March 2,
2010, the Council members examined the progress of Paragraph 6
System. 172
Contrary to the urgency of the issue raised by several
developing and least-developed countries in the 2003 meeting that
implemented the Paragraph 6 System, the TRIPS Council
determined that only twenty-six members (counting the European
Communities as one member) have formally accepted the Protocol
of 2005, which proposes to amend the TRIPS Agreement
permanently to include the provisions of the Paragraph 6
System. 7 1 Considering that a ratification by two thirds of the 153
WTO members is necessary to amend the TRIPS Agreement, and
that most of the least-developed countries, the intended
169 Id.
170 See generally, id. (stating that the generic drug producers cannot rely upon such
an uncertain system).
171 See generally, Toronto, supra note 154, at 6 (arguing that the information that is
required adds time and makes the process more complicated than a system which would
not possess this requirement).
172 See World Trade Organization, Members Ask: If The "Par. 6" System
Intellectual Property and Health Working, WTO: 2010 NEWS ITEM, Mar. 2, 2010,
http://www.wto.org/english/news e/news 1 Oe/trip_02mar 1 0e.htm [hereinafter News].
173 TRIPS Council Minutes, supra note 33, at 22.
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beneficiaries of the Paragraph 6 System, have not accepted the
Protocol, many members of WTO, including India, Brazil, China,
Ecuador, Cuba, Egypt, and Indonesia, raised concerns that the
Paragraph 6 System was not working effectively.174
Some of the issues raised in the TRIPS council meeting
include: the complexity of utilizing Canada's system and the
length of time it takes to use such a system; the uncertainty and
high burden placed on the generic drug producer by the Paragraph
6 System; and criticisms that the use of the System is not demand
driven, or otherwise economically sound. 175 However, several
members, including the U.S., Canada, European Communities
Argentina, and Switzerland, argued that its rare use might not
necessarily indicate its inefficacy.176 Rather, they argued that the
access issue has substantially improved since 2003, and that many
other options are now available to the least-developed countries to
obtain the necessary medicine. 77
With respect to the complexity of the system, Brazil and
several other developing countries noted that, in the case of the
Canada-Rwanda deal, it took approximately three years for the
first shipment of Apo-TriAvir to be delivered to Rwanda from the
time Apotex first applied to use the system in Canada."' The
timeline provided by Canada during TRIPS Council meeting is
provided below:
* May 2005 - CAMR regulation took effect
* December 2005 - Apotex applied to use the System
* June 2006 - Apotex was approved as a compulsory
licensing exporter
* July 2007 - Apotex identified Rwanda as a
customer
* September 2007 - after requesting voluntary
licensing from the patent holder, Apotex applied for
a compulsory licensing to produce Apo-TriAvir.
* October 2007 - Compulsory licensing was granted
174 See id. at 25; Mara, supra note 160.
175 Mara, supra note 160.
176 Id.
'77 Id.
178 TRIPS Council Minutes, supra note 33, at 24-25; News, supra note 172.
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to Apotex
* May 2008 - Apo-TriAvir was produced by Apotex
* September 2008 - the first shipment of Apo-
TriAvir was shipped to Rwandal 79
The timeline indicates that while Apotex applied to use the
System in December 2005, it took until July 2007 for Apotex to
identify Rwanda as a customer.'s Thus, at least for the Canada-
Rwanda deal, it appears that locating an importing country for the
deal proved to be a significant burden for Apotex.'8 '
In fact, commentators have noted that while CAMR
requires the applicant to identify a prospective purchaser, who is
to be a developing country, before filing the application, such a
practice is contrary to the industry's customary procurement
practices in purchasing generic pharmaceuticals. 18 2 The customary
practice in generic purchase involves public bidding.'83 In other
words, the purchaser or the correct producer cannot be identified
until it is clear that the generic drug maker can produce a certain
amount at a certain price; thus, the CAMR procedure, which
requires the identification of each purchaser before filing the
application, is incompatible with the customary practice.'84
By the time Rwanda obtained the necessary shipment of
Apo-TriAvir from Apotex, Indian generic makers were producing
similar products at even lower prices.' This fact demonstrates
that the length of time necessary for the negotiation to materialize
must be shortened for an effective use of the Paragraph 6 System,
and that generic drug producers should not be required to provide
179 News, supra note 172.
180 Mara, supra note 160.
181 See generally id. The fact that it took Apotex three years to ship its first shipment
to Rwanda shows that this was a burden for the company. Id.
182 See Toronto, supra note 154, at 6-7; Canada Notice, supra note 100, at 1128.
183 Canada Notice, supra note 100, at 1128.
184 See id. Until the public bidding process takes place to identify who is able to
produce the needed amount of the drug and who is willing to purchase the drug, the
application process cannot begin. Once a producer and a purchaser have agreed to a bid,
the producer can file the application, as the producer is unable to name the purchaser
until this point.
185 Id.
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the identity of importing counties when the applications are
initially filed.
Another hindrance to the application process is that the
patent holder can attempt to delay the process by seeking court
actions or challenging the compulsory license. 1' Many generic
drug producers would not be willing to take on the expensive
venture of implementing the manufacture of a drug and obtaining
necessary regulatory approvals in the face of such uncertainty.187
Currently, several different venues by which generic drugs may be
purchased exist for most countries; some of these venues remain
viable options that provide a greater certainty for obtaining
necessary medicine at a desired price and quantity.'
In addition, the Paragraph 6 System's requirement to
specially mark the exported drugs, as implemented by CAMR,
essentially limits the profit that a generic drug producer may
obtain by participating in the System by limiting the producer to
exporting only the quantity needed.189 Also cumbersome is the
time and effort involved. The generic drug producer has to
maintain the necessary manufacturing facilities and pass all
regulatory requirements in order to produce the generic drug.'90
Thus, at this time, use of the system is not very attractive to
generic drug producers. A method by which the generic drug
produced for an exporting country can be supplied to additional
markets, including other eligible countries, may be necessary for
the generic drug producer to operate with a profit.
The United States, Switzerland, Canada, and European
Communities have argued that the rare use of the Paragraph 6
System is not an indication of its ineffectiveness or its lack of
186 Tsai, supra note 163, at 1078-79.
187 See Mara, supra note 160 (stating that the mandate that the generic drug
producer must contact the patent holder creates a burden that the generic drug producer
may not view as outweighing any benefit that comes of it).
188 See CORREA, supra note 22, at 5.
189 See Mara, supra note 160; see generally, Toronto, supra note 154, at 10-11
(explaining that under CAMR the producer is restricted from exporting more than what
is needed by the importing country, and the limited quantity implies that the profits are
limited).
190 See generally Mara, supra note 160 (noting that in order to benefit, a producer
must have the facilities and the capacity to manufacture the drug).
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workability.' 9' Rather, they argue that the Canada-Rwanda deal
indicates that the system can be effectively used, and the deal
paves the way for wider use of the system.19 2 Further, many other
flexibilities exist as possible options for member countries to
obtain the necessary medicine at this time. 93
Some commentators have noted that the requirement that a
country notify the TRIPS Council of its need to use the Paragraph
6 System may be working as a deterrent for some developing
countries to using the system. '94 Many countries have faced
severe political pressures when they have attempted to use
compulsory licensing, including economic and political pressures
from developed countries.195
For example, in 2007, when Thailand issued a compulsory
license for Abbott's Kaletra@,'9 6 U.S. Trade Representatives put
Thailand on a "priority watch list." 9 7 In addition, Abbot retaliated
by withholding its application for regulatory approval for its new
heat-resistant form of Kaletra@, which would have been very
beneficial in Thailand's hot climate. 198 This type of hostile
treatment from developed countries would necessarily cause
hesitation on the part of developing and least-developed countries
in taking the necessary political or legislative initiative to use the
Paragraph 6 System.
However, the Canada-Rwanda deal also illustrates that
open communication regarding access to medicine at TRIPS
191 See generally TRIPS Council Minutes, supra note 33, at 23-25.
192 Canada also argues that the Canada-Rwanda deal is indicative of a system that
can be effectively used. See id. at 23; see also Mara, supra note 160.
193 See CORREA, supra note 22, at 5.
194 See Mara, supra note 160.
195 See CORREA, supra note 22, at 7-8; see also Keith Alcorn, Abbott to Withhold
New Drugs from Thailand in Retaliation for Kaletra Compulsory Licence, AIDSMAP,
(Mar. 15, 2007),
http://www.aidsmap.com/en/news/00C7641B-57F5-4AB8-8876-9040425D4464.asp;
U.S. Trade Representative Places Thailand on Priority Watch List in Annual Report,
MEDICAL NEWS TODAY (May 3, 2007),
http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/69507.php [hereinafter U.S. Trade
Representative]; Mara, supra note 160.
196 KALETRA, Registration No. 2451327.
197 Alcorn, supra note 195; U.S. Trade Representative, supra note 195.
198 Alcom, supra note 195.
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Council meetings since the Doha Declaration of 2001 has
substantially increased international consensus to allow the least-
developed countries to utilize the flexibilities embedded in the
TRIPS Agreement. 199 Unquestionably, more least-developed
countries may consider utilizing the Paragraph 6 System as a result
of the Canada-Rwanda deal.
V. Importance of the Paragraph 6 System and Actions
Required to Ensure Effective Use of the System
Even with the various difficulties involved in using the
Paragraph 6 System, it is predicted that it and other compulsory
licensing schemes will become more and more important to
developing and least-developed countries in the coming decades as
the current international source of generic medicine depletes over
time.
A. Expiration of Transition Periods and Elevated Importance
of the Paragraph 6 System
In order to comply with the TRIPS transition period
schedule, numerous mid-income developing countries-including
India, China, and Brazil-became fully compliant with the TRIPS
Agreement by 2005 by granting both process and product patents
for pharmaceutical products. 200 For the least-developed country
members, the Doha Declaration of 2001 extended the transition
period for full compliance with the TRIPS Agreement with respect
to pharmaceutical patents to January 1, 2016.201
Many of the mid-income countries that became fully
compliant with the TRIPS Agreement in 2005 served as sources of
199 HESTERMEYER, supra note 8, at 258-60, 261-64. Hestermeyer and other authors
agree that Doha Declaration reaffirmed the Member countries' right to use the
flexibilities of TRIPS to the full extent. The Paragraph 6 System stems from one of
these flexibilities through series of international negotiations and council meetings. Id.
See also TRIPS Council Minutes, supra note 33. An overview of the meeting minutes
indicates that there is now a consensus among the Members that the use of the
flexibilities available under the TRIPS Agreement is acceptable; this is in sharp contrast
to prior assertions made between the developed and developing countries regarding that
types of measures are permissible. Id.
200 HESTERMEYER, supra note 8, at 260.
201 Doha Declaration, supra note 6, 17.
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generic drugs before the transition.20 2 In particular, a large portion
of the world's generic AIDS medicine originates from India. For
example, M6decins Sans Frontibres ("MSF"), also known as
Doctors Without Borders, obtains approximately 84% of its
generic AIDS medicine in India. 203 The 2005 changes to Indian
patent law, however, will gradually result in a depletion of this
source of cheap generic drugs. The change is not significantly
noticeable at this time because many of the drugs that are now
available in generic form in India will remain unprotected by
patents, unless the patent application for the active ingredients was
deposited with the Indian Patent Office under the mailbox
provision of the TRIPS Agreement. 204 However, new drugs
developed after 2005 are likely to be protected by both product
and process patents in India and by other mid-income countries
that produce generic drugs.
While it may not be economically attractive for many
generic drug producers to serve as a Paragraph 6 System exporter
in the current market, as the sources of the generic drug are
substantially depleted over time, the only method by which a
country with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities may
obtain certain medicines at competitive pricing may be to utilize
the Paragraph 6 System.
In addition, the Paragraph 6 System may prove to be
increasingly important as those now using the first-line treatment
for HIV/AIDS shift into using second-line treatments. Patients on
the antiretroviral treatment are expected to use the treatment for
several years or decades because no permanent cure for AIDS
exists.20 5 A large number of these patients develop drug resistance
202 Sangeeta Shashikant, More Countries Use Compulsory License, But New
Problems Emerge, TWN THIRD WORLD NETWORK (May 19, 2005),
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/health.info/twninfohealth004.htm.
203 Id.; see generally Pooja Van Dyke, Importing Western Style, Exporting Tragedy:
Changes in Indian Patent Law and Their Impact on AIDS Treatment in Africa, 6 NW. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 138 (2007-2008); Amelia Gentleman, Indian Law on Generic
Drugs is Upheld, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/06/business/worldbusiness/06iht-drug.4.7005552.html.
204 Shashikant, supra note 202.
205 Universal Access, supra note 116, at 68.
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or side effects within this time period, causing them to switch over
to a second-line combination.2 06
Based on one study, almost 22% of people on treatment
need to switch over to a second-line treatment within a five-year
time period. 207 The second-line combinations for AIDS currently
remain substantially more expensive than the first-line
combinations.20 8 M6decins Sans Frontibres predicts that second-
line combinations are not likely to drop 99% in price like the first-
line combinations. 20 9 Indeed, second-line combinations can cost
up to four to eleven times as much as the first-line treatments.2 10
An increased percentage of current patients under the first-line
treatment will switch over to the second-line treatment in the
future.2 11 For these treatments and other widely patent protected
treatments, the Paragraph 6 System may prove to be an important
mechanism for obtaining a bulk of the medicine at competitive
prices.
B. Initiatives National Governments Must Take To Use the
System
Governmental action is necessary at various levels to use
the Paragraph 6 System or the general compulsory licensing
scheme.
First, a country must implement national legislation to
support use of the Paragraph 6 System.2 12 As noted above, only a
handful of nations have taken the steps to actively change their
national patent law to provide a legal framework for generic drug
producers such as Apotex to act as a supplier under the Paragraph
6 System. 213 In addition, the response from the least-developed
206 See generally id., at 76 (noting that the rate of individuals needing second-line
treatments is increasing as more individuals are becoming resistant to first-line
treatments).
207 Satyanarayana, supra note 72, at 43 ("Data from Africa show that over a five
year period 22% people needed such a switch-over.").
208 Shashikant, supra note 202.
209 Satyanarayana, supra note 72.
210 Id.
211 See Shashikant, supra note 202.
212 See CORREA, supra note 22, at 5-8.
213 See id. at 7-8.
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countries, the primary intended beneficiaries of the Paragraph 6
System, has been tepid at best.2 14 Member nations should consider
amending their national patent laws in an effective manner to
facilitate compulsory license requests and the Paragraph 6 System,
as stated above.2 15
Secondly, the Paragraph 6 System is a way in which a
government can obtain a bulk of generic drugs by negotiating for
their importation at a national level. In other words, the national
governments of the least-developed nations must take on the role
of invoking the use of the Paragraph 6 System for the benefit of its
population.2 16
As noted above, while some developing countries have
historically faced severe opposition from brand-name
pharmaceutical companies and developed nations when attempting
to grant compulsory license, awareness of the access to medicine
issue has substantially improved through open dialogue within the
international community. While the developed countries should
remain true to their commitment in supporting access to medicine
by living up to the promise of the Doha Declaration, the least-
developed countries should find ways to take initiatives in using
the flexibilities currently available under the TRIPS Agreement. 2 17
In addition, the antiretroviral medicines cannot be
distributed without a health service system. Unfortunately, many
people in the least-developed countries have only limited access to
health service professionals, as illustrated in the figures below
which are from a WHO report.2 18 Without first establishing an
effective distribution system, access to medicine will remain a
great challenge even if the necessary medications are obtained via
the Paragraph 6 System or other TRIPS flexibilities.
214 TRIPS Council Minutes, supra note 33, at 24.
215 See CORREA, supra note 22, at 5-8.
216 See Shashikant, supra note 202.
217 Id.
218 World Health Organization, The World Health Report 2006-Working Together
for Health, at 12-13 (2006), available at http://www.who.int/whr/2006/whrO6_en.pdf.
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Countres with a citical shortage of health service providers(doctors, nurses and rmidwves)
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Some developing and least-developed countries have
successfully set up a government-based AIDS program or national
health insurance program to increase access to health services.
For example, Brazil's AIDS program has been very
successful in increasing access to antiretroviral treatment. 2 19 A
glimpse of Brazil's commitment to provide access to medicine can
be obtained from its Constitution of 1988, which declares access
to medicine to be a constitutional right. 220  Even with the high
income disparity in the country-the top 20% of earners making
approximately twenty-four times the income of the bottom 20% of
219 HESTERMEYER, supra note 8, at 10-11.
220 Article 196 of Brazilian Constitution of 1988 states that, "Health is the right of
all persons and the duty of the State and is guaranteed by means of social and economic
policies aimed at reducing the risk of illness and other hazards and at universal and equal
access to all actions and services for the promotion, protection and recovery of health."
CONSTITUIqAo FEDERAL [C.F.] art. 196.
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earners-Brazil's AIDS program successfully reduced its AIDS
mortality rate by providing free access to antiretroviral medicines
for all residents determined to be in need of treatment. 221
According to one study, due to the improvement in the health
condition of Brazilians under treatment, the AIDS program may
have actually saved approximately $200 million in health costs. 2 22
Moreover, having a national program has allowed Brazil to
negotiate for price concession for antiretroviral medicine more
effectively. Brazil has at times utilized compulsory licensing. For
example, Brazil issued compulsory licensing for Roche's
nelfinavir in 2001, and for Merck's Efavirenz in 2007.223 In
addition, through active government involvement in procuring
necessary medicine, and by employing the threat of compulsory
licensing, Brazil has successfully reduced the cost of antiretroviral
treatment by over 50%.224 One study indicates that Brazil has
saved approximately $1.2 billion between 2001 and 2005 by price
concession over antiretroviral treatments.22 5
Establishing an effective distribution system is the first
step in increasing access to medicine. As demonstrated by the
example of Brazil, national governments can save billions of
dollars in healthcare costs by improving their national health care
systems and negotiating for price concessions by obtaining
medicines in bulk.226
221 A.S. Nunn et al., Evolution ofAntiretroviral Drug Costs in Brazil in the Context
ofFree and Universal Access to AIDS treatment, 4 PLoS MEDICINE 1804, 1805 (2007).
222 Paulo R. Teixeira, Marco Ant6nio Vit6ria, & ihoney Barcarlo, Antiretroviral
Treatment in Resource-Poor Settings: the Brazilian Experience, 18 AIDS S5, S6-S7
(Supplement 3 2004).
223 Brazil's Success in AIDS Fight Depends on Cheap Drugs, AFP (Jul. 30, 2008),
http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5ieTOIHsJgOHEPjVBfKCZg75IOCRQ; Nicoli J.
Nattrass, The (Political) Economics of Antiretroviral Treatment in Developing
Countries, 16 TRENDS IN MICROBIOLOGY 574, 575 (2008); International Centre for Trade
and Sustainable Development, Brazil Grants Compulsory License, News and Analysis,
BRIDGES WEEKLY TRADE NEWS DIGEST, May 9, 2007, available at
http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridges/1 1643/.
224 Nunn, supra note 221, at S5.
225 Id. ("We estimate that in the absence of price declines for patented drugs, Brazil
would have spent a cumulative total of $2 billion on drugs for HAART between 2001
and 2005, implying a savings of $1.2 billion from price declines").
226 Wendell Roelf, S. Africa to Buy Cheaper AIDS Drugs Despite Opposition,
REUTERS (Apr. 13, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE63C3Q520100413;
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VI. Impediments & Potential Threats to the Paragraph 6
System
Apart from the various issues regarding efficiency of the
system and the lack of governmental initiatives to implement the
system at the national legislation level mentioned above,227 there
remain several potential impediments to effectively using the
Paragraph 6 System and other flexibilities available under the
TRIPS Agreement. Some of the major impediments are: (1)
TRIPS-plus agreements; (2) seizure in transit; and (3) the patent
pooling system proposed by UNITAID.
A. TRIPS-plus Agreements
Bilateral or multilateral agreements made outside the
context of the TRIPS Agreement can reduce the flexibilities
embedded in the TRIPS Agreements by imposing obligations
beyond those imposed by the TRIPS Agreement, thereby creating
agreements that are now referred to as "TRIPS-plus" agreements.
TRIPS-plus agreements can substantially reduce or
possibly eliminate the benefit that can be derived from the
Paragraph 6 System. 228 For example, the U.S. Free Trade
Agreements ("FTAs") with Australia, various Central American
countries, Chile, Jordan, and Morocco, each require data
exclusivity for at least five years after the date of a pharmaceutical
product's first regulatory approval in the respective country.22 9
Generic drug makers usually rely on the clinical data
generated by brand-name companies to obtain regulatory approval
in different countries.23 0 With the data exclusivity requirement,
Nattrass, supra note 223, at 574-75 (noting that the governments in Thailand and Brazil
substantially lowered the cost of HAART for the nation as a whole by involving
themselves in negotiation, and were able to provide a larger amount of coverage than
expected for their respective populations considering their economic, demographic and
institutional characteristics); see also Amy S. Nunn, supra note 221, at 1804.
227 Part V.B.
228 See Shashikant, supra note 202.
229 CORREA, supra note 22, at 7-8.
230 Smith, supra note 46, at 687 (explaining that generic drug producers often rely
on the data produced by the originator companies to obtain approval of the generic
versions of the drug); Chutima Akaleephan, Extension of Market Exclusivity and Its
Impact on the Accessibility to Essential Medicines, and Drug Expense in Thailand:
Analysis of the Effect of TRIPS-Plus Proposal, HEALTH POLICY 91, 175, 179 (2009).
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even if a generic drug maker intends to produce the medicine, it
would not be able to sell the medicine until it has generated
sufficient clinical data of its own for the drug's regulatory
approval in the respective countries. This data generation may be
costly and could take up to several years to produce, in addition to
being a tremendous waste of resources in terms of duplication of
data. Most often, generic drug producers would be deterred from
supplying the medicine during those first five years, creating a de
facto extension of the patent term.23 1
Some FTAs require patent term extension of new drugs
based on the time lost in administrative delay while granting the
patent.232 These requirements are in line with similar legislation
under U.S. patent law, known as the Hatch-Waxman legislation.23 3
This type of patent term extension can be very costly to national
healthcare consumers or to the national government if the
government provides the treatment.
According to one study conducted to assess the cost
increase associated with the potential implementation of a U.S.-
Thailand FTA Agreement, it is estimated that the typical five-year
market exclusivity extension may increase the annual costs of all
innovative drugs used in Thailand from approximately $146.3
million to $696.4 million, representing 9.4-44.7% of the total
medicine expenditure in Thailand as of 2002.234 As such, the long-
Requirements such as test data exclusivity and patent term compensation are typical to
TRIPS-plus agreement with US, and the author notes that these types of requirements
lead to an extension of monopoly and can add up to a substantial health cost to the nation
over five year period. Id.
231 Smith, supra note 46, at 687; Jonathan de Ridder, Data Exclusivity: Further
Protection for Pharmaceuticals, FINDLAw AUSTRALIA,
http://www.findlaw.com.au/articles/1576/data-exclusivity-further-protection-for-
pharmaceut.aspx (last visited Oct. 28, 2010); Praveen Dalal, Data Exclusivity: An Indian
Perspective, IPFRONTLINE.COM (Aug. 19, 2006),
http://www.ipfrontline.com/depts/article.asp?id=12300&deptid-6.
232 Akaleephan, supra note 230, at 175 (noting that one of the common
requirements of TRIPs-plus agreement includes patent term compensation for granting
delay).
233 Shashikant, supra note 202; 35 U.S.C. § 156.
234 Chutima Akaleephan, Extension of Market Exclusivity and Its Impact on the
Accessibility to Essential Medicines, and Drug Expense in Thailand: Analysis of the
Effect of TRIPs-Plus Proposal, HEALTH POLICY 91, 174, 181 (2009).
2010] 181
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
term effect of adopting a TRIPS-plus agreement can be substantial
in terms of health cost. Developing countries need to consider the
cost associated with implementing FTAs carefully before
engaging in international agreements that may compromise the
flexibilities provided under the TRIPS Agreement.
Economic development plays a big part in improving
public health, and the prestige offered in having an FTA with the
U.S. and other developed countries still continues to lure many
developing and least-developed countries to form such FTAs.
Currently, the United States is in the process of negotiating FTAs
with Columbia, Panama, and South Korea, to name a few. 23 5
These FTAs include provisions regarding data exclusivity and
patent term extension for time lost due to the administrative delay
caused in the patent granting process.23 6 Countries entering into an
FTA, well as other bilateral or regional agreements, should
carefully examine the potential negative public health implications
and possible economic impact of adopting a TRIPS-plus
agreement.
B. Seizure in Transit
Recently, European authorities have seized a number of
consignments of generic drugs in transit from India to other
countries under EC Regulation 1383/2003, a new regulation
purportedly implemented as a measure against counterfeit
medicine.2 37 As international trade often requires shipment of the
products through a number of ports while en route to the
destination country, such seizure in transit poses a big threat to
utilizing the Paragraph 6 System and other flexibilities embedded
in the TRIPS Agreement.23 8
During the TRIPS council meeting held on October 27-28,
and November 6, 2009, the Indian representative deemed the
seizure in transit as one of many "serious impediments to access to
medicines." 239 As pointed out by the India representative during
235 Id. at 174.
236 Id. at 175.
237 TRIPS Council Minutes, supra note 33, at 48.
238 Id.
239 Id. at 47.
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the meeting, the seizure in transit incident was inconsistent with
the Paragraph 6 System, as such seizure could prevent the
hypothetical shipment of a generic drug from an exporting country
to a least-developed country in a timely manner.240
In previous TRIPS council meetings, the European
Communities have stated that these incidents are caused by
procedural difficulties and have given assurance that necessary
measures will be taken to avoid seizure of generic medicines. 241 It
is extremely important for the international community that the
European Communities take prompt measures to ensure this type
of interference with other countries' legitimate rights in trade do
not occur in the future.
C. Patent Pooling
Under its 5 February 2010 resolution, UNITAID, an
international organization that supplies HIV/AIDS, malaria, and
tuberculosis drugs, is currently working on the implementation of
a voluntary patent pooling system in which brand-name
pharmaceutical companies can contribute their patents in exchange
for royalties from licensees.24 2 The details of this voluntary patent
pooling system are scheduled to be agreed upon by June 2010.243
Surprisingly, the patent pooling system, which has been proposed
as a solution for easier access to obtaining licenses, has been
identified as a threat to the current compulsory licensing
scheme. 24
240 Id. at 48-49.
241 Id. at 47-48.
242 UNITAID, Minutes of Eleventh Executive Board Session - Special Session on
Patent Pool, (Feb. 5, 2010), available at http://www.unitaid.eu/images/EB 1l/UNITAID-
EB I I-SSPP-provisional-recordFinal.pdf.
243 Id. at 11.
244 See Letter from NWGPL, Centad, Locost, Drug Action Forum, AIDAN, and
IHES, to the UNITAID Board Chair (Dec. 11, 2009) (on file with author). In a joint
letter submitted by NWGPL, Centad, Locost, Drug Action Forum, AIDAN, IHES,
several civil society organizations noted the potential danger of a badly drafted patent
pooling system as potentially undermining of compulsory licensing scheme, reducing
supports for patent oppositions in India, from where many of generic drugs now
onginate, suppressing of local production of HIV medicines, etc. Id.
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Commentators agree that there may be many potential
benefits within a well-implemented patent pooling system.2 45 For
example, because antiretroviral treatments often cover several
patented products, patent pooling may facilitate the development
of fixed-dose combinations by using known ingredients from
different pharmaceutical companies.24 Additionally, according to
the preliminary plan proposed during the 2009 meeting at
UNITAID, the royalty rate paid to the patent holder will be
determined based on the economic condition of the user country.24 7
Setting the royalty rate based on the economic condition of the
user country may create a system of licensing akin to multi-level
price discrimination. Such a system would allow the brand-name
pharmaceutical companies to retain some portion of their
economic rent in the developed countries in order to recoup R&D
costs while also significantly. reducing the transaction costs for
obtaining licenses.
However, several potential problems have been identified
with regard to the patent pooling system.248 These include the
possibility that the patent pooling system will actually prevent the
least-developed countries from using compulsory licensing to
obtain antiretroviral drugs at an even cheaper price. The brand-
name pharmaceutical companies may argue that voluntary
licensing at a reasonable royalty rate has already been provided
245 Satyanarayana, supra note 72, at 50-52 (indicating that the various potential
benefits include lowering price for developing countries, and easier and faster
development of combinations); Equal Treatment, supra note 85, at 23; Daniele Dionisio,
Unbiased HIV Patent Pool: A Free-Market, Middle-Income Countries Open Model
(April 1, 2010), INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WATCH,
http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2010/04/01/unbiased-hiv-patent-pool-a-free-market-
middle-income-countries-open-model (noting that a well-implemented system may
provide increased access while allowing the brand name pharmaceutical complies to
maintain high R&D standards and some marketing power); Mohga Kamal Yanni,
Historic Decision on Access to Medicines: UNITAID Patent Pool Approved to Lower
Prices for HIV Treatment, Oxfam International, OXFAM INT'L BLOGS, HEALTH AND
EDUCATION FOR ALL (Dec. 18, 2009, 3:09 PM), http://blogs.oxfam.org/en/blog/09-12-18-
historic-decision-HIV-medicines-unitaid-patent-pool-approved.
246 See Satyanarayana, supra note 72, Table 1.
247 UNITAID, supra note 242.
248 Letter from the UNITAID Executive Board, submitted to the UNITAID Board
Chair (Dec. 11, 2009) (on file with author).
[Vol. XXXVI184
PARAGRAPH 6 SYSTEM FOR ACCESS TO MEDICINE
when the patent holder is a part of the patent pooling system.249 In
such a case, the "prior negotiation" requirement of Article 31(b)
for granting compulsory patent license would be impossible to
satisfy, and the compulsory license scheme may become
unusable.2 50
There are also concerns that this system will substantially
erode the economic benefits for the innovators of the new drugs,
and reallocate them to the middle-income countries such as India,
China, Brazil, South Africa, and Thailand, which have the
manufacturing facilities to produce generic drugs in bulk for
exportation .251 As participation in the patent pool system would be
voluntary, the brand-name pharmaceutical companies may have an
unfairly high amount of leverage in shaping the system or may
even fail to participate altogether.2 52
The international community has much at stake in the
careful examination of the details of implementing this patent
pooling system.
VII. Conclusion
Even with its complex procedural requirements, the
Paragraph 6 System is expected to become increasingly important
to countries with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities,
especially as India and other important international sources of
generic drugs become fully compliant with the TRIPS Agreement.
Several recommendations have been made with respect to
measures that individual countries should take to facilitate the use
of the Paragraph 6 System, including providing an effective
distribution system and actively negotiating for price concession,
as Brazil has done so successfully.
Countries that may benefit from the Paragraph 6 System
need to take action to make the necessary legislative changes in
facilitating the use of the System. Further, those countries that
249 Id.
250 Id.
251 See generally Daniele Dionisio, Unbiased HIV Patent Pool: A Free-Market,
Middle-Income Countries Open Model (April 1, 2010), INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
WATCH, available at http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2010/04/01/unbiased-hiv-patent-
pool-a-free-market-middle-income-countries-open-model/.
252 Id.
2010] 185
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
may be eligible to act as importing nations should provide an
effective mechanism through which those in need-the medical
community and patients who need their medication-can bring
their need to the attention of the national government in order to
act on their behalf.
As illustrated by the Apo-TriAvir trade between Canada
and Rwanda, to implement national legislation as a potential
exporting country, the procedure for requesting compulsory
licensing under the Paragraph 6 System should be simplified as
much as possible. In particular, while CAMR required generic
drug producers to provide the identity of the importing country on
their initial applications, this approach should be avoided as it may
not conform to the customary practice in purchasing generic drugs.
In addition, the international community has a high stake in
UNITAID's careful framing of the patent pooling scheme. Also,
the European Communities should ensure that legitimate
international trade of generic drugs is not hindered by any
incidence of seizure in transit.
Lastly, countries should refrain from taking on TRIPS-plus
obligations through FTAs or other bilateral or regional treaties, as
the flexibilities embedded in the TRIPS Agreement may be
compromised by these treaties. Having at their disposal all
flexibilities available under the TRIPS Agreement and maintaining
a zone of autonomy may prove to be of paramount importance to
future legislators, because without such flexibilities, each country
cannot choose the legislation or regime that best serves the unique
needs of its population. In interest of good governance, restrictive
FTAs, seizure in transit, and other mechanisms by which one
country tries to decide the legislation of another country should be
curtailed, leaving each country to determine for itself the best way
to protect its public health.
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